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Recently, some philosophers of science (e.g., Gürol Irzik, Michael Friedman) have challenged 
the ‘received view’ on the relationship between Rudolf Carnap and Thomas Kuhn, suggesting 
that there is a close affinity (rather than opposition) between their philosophical views. In 
support of this argument, these authors cite Carnap and Kuhn’s similar views on 
incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific revolutions. Against this revisionist view, I 
argue that the philosophical relationship between Carnap and Kuhn should be regarded as 
opposed rather than complementary. In particular, I argue that a consideration of the 
fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical projects of Carnap (logic of science) 
and Kuhn (providing a theory of scientific revolutions) renders the alleged similarities between 
their views superficial in comparison to their fundamental differences. In defense of the received 
view, I suggest that Carnap and Kuhn are model representatives of two contrasting styles of 
doing philosophy of science, viz., logical analysis and historical analysis respectively. This 
analysis clarifies the role played by Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in the demise of 
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Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) and Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) are undoubtedly two of the most 
influential twentieth-century philosophers of science. According to the ‘received view’ on the 
Carnap-Kuhn relationship, Carnap’s and Kuhn’s views represent diametrically opposed 
approaches to philosophy of science and Kuhn’s ([1962] 1996) Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions is one of the main philosophical works—along with Quine’s ([1951] 1980) “Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism”—that (rightfully) contributed to demise of logical empiricism in the 
1960s and 1970s. While the received view has been commonplace among post-positivist 
philosophers of science (e.g., see Suppe [1974] 1977; Giere 1988, ch. 2; McGuire 1992), this 
narrative about the history of philosophy of science has been increasingly called into question in 
recent decades. 
  Some historians of philosophy of science (Reisch 1991; Earman 1993; Irzik and 
Grünberg 1995; Friedman 2001, 2003; Irzik 2002, 2003; Richardson 2007; Gattei 2008, ch. 5; 
Uebel 2011) have argued that the received view on Carnap and Kuhn is mistaken, suggesting that 
there is a close affinity between their philosophical views. The basis for this revised 
understanding stems from some fundamental similarities between the philosophical systems of 
Carnap and Kuhn, especially on issues concerning incommensurability, theory-choice, and the 
nature of scientific revolutions. The upshot of this revisionist picture is that the “two styles of 
doing philosophy of science epitomized by Carnap and Kuhn should be seen as complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive” (Irzik and Grünberg 1995, pp. 304-305). Furthermore, some 
revisionists have drawn the more radical conclusion that this revised understanding on the 
relationship between Carnap and Kuhn “undermines the widely held belief that post-positivist 
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philosophy of science represents a revolutionary departure from its arch-rival positivism, at least 
in the context of Carnap’s and Kuhn’s works” (Irzik and Grünberg 1995, p. 304). 
 In this paper, I argue against the revisionist conclusion that Carnap’s and Kuhn’s 
philosophical views are closely aligned; moreover, I reject the revisionist idea that Kuhn’s 
philosophical views do not represent a revolutionary departure from Carnap’s.1 While there are 
undoubtedly similarities between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s philosophical systems, I argue that a 
consideration of their broader philosophical projects renders these similarities superficial in 
comparison to their fundamental differences. On a general level, revisionist analyses fail to 
sufficiently acknowledge that Carnap’s linguistic frameworks are logical reconstructions 
intended to clarify answerable (i.e., meaningful) and unanswerable (i.e., meaningless) questions, 
while Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions is motivated to provide a naturalistic description of 
scientific change. This difference reflects two vastly different styles of doing philosophy of 
science (viz., logical analysis versus historical analysis). On a more specific level, I argue that 
Carnap’s stance on incommensurability is far less robust than Kuhn’s, Carnap holds a more 
instrumentalist position on theory-choice than Kuhn, and Carnap’s analysis of revolutions is 
antithetical to Kuhn’s. From this perspective, I suggest that the methodologies of Carnap and 
Kuhn are correctly regarded as two contrasting philosophical styles that mark a significant 
division between positivist and post-positivist philosophy of science.  
                                                            
1At the outset, it is important to note that there is variability among how strongly (and how qualified) the revisionist 
thesis is advanced by various authors. Moreover, different revisionist analyses have been forwarded for various 
purposes, e.g., Friedman’s (2001, 2003) analysis is motivated to demonstrate a shared neo-Kantian heritage inherited 
by Carnap and Kuhn (see DiSalle 2002; Richardson 2002; Tsou 2003; Lange 2004). The main target of the argument 
in this paper is Gürol Irzik and Teo Grünberg’s (1995) influential article, “Carnap and Kuhn: Arch Enemies or Close 
Allies?,” which offers one of the strongest expressions of the revisionist view. While my argument focuses on Irzik 
and Grunberg’s (1995) article, it is more broadly applicable to other revisionist analyses that, either explicitly or 
implicitly, follow a similar line of reasoning. 
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2. The Revisionist View 
The basis for the revisionist view stems from parallels in Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions 
and Carnap’s philosophy of linguistic frameworks (Friedman 2001, pp. 41-43, 2003, pp. 20-22; 
Richardson 2007, pp. 354-356). Kuhn’s claim that the solution to scientific puzzles is provided 
by the tacit rules of a paradigm is similar to Carnap’s ([1950] 1956) claim that answers to 
meaningful (internal) questions are provided by the rules of a linguistic framework. Moreover, 
just as Kuhn maintains that there are no clearly defined (algorithmic) rules for choosing among 
competing paradigms, Carnap holds that there is no cognitively significant (i.e., meaningful) way 
of choosing among alternative linguistic frameworks. On this issue, both Kuhn and Carnap 
maintain that these decisions must be made on non-epistemic grounds. For revisionists, these 
similarities suggest a significant point of agreement between Carnap and Kuhn grounded in “a 
pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist picture of science” (Irzik and Grünberg 1995, p. 
285).  
 Revisionists contend that both Carnap and Kuhn endorse a version of the 
incommensurability thesis (Irzik and Grünberg 1995; Irzik 2002; Richardson 2007, pp. 356-357). 
Incommensurability is central to Kuhn’s ([1962] 1996, chs. 9-10) idea that competing paradigms 
are incompatible to the extent that proponents of competing paradigms cannot communicate with 
one another since their theoretical and epistemic commitments preclude them from 
comprehending alternative views. In Structure (Kuhn [1962] 1996), incommensurability variably 
refers to the incompatibility of problems and standards (p. 103, pp. 148-149), meaning (pp. 101-
103, p. 149), and perception (p. 112, p. 150). In post-Structure writings, Kuhn (2000) offers a 
more precisely defined thesis of ‘local incommensurability’ in terms of untranslatability: “The 
claim that two theories are incommensurable is . . . the claim that there is no language, neutral or 
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otherwise, into which both theories, conceived as sentences, can be translated without residue or 
loss” (p. 36). To support the idea that Carnap endorses a similar thesis, Irzik and Grünberg 
(1995, pp. 291-295) point to Carnap’s ([1936] 1949) claim that competing linguistic frameworks 
are sometimes untranslatable: 
In translating one language into another the factual content of an empirical statement 
cannot always be preserved unchanged. Such changes are inevitable if the structures of 
the two languages differ in essential points. . . . [W]hile many statements of modern 
physics are completely translatable into statements of classical physics, this is not so . . . 
when the statement . . . contains concepts (like, e.g., ‘wave-function’ or ‘quantization’) 
which simply do not occur in classical physics . . . [T]hese concepts cannot be . . . 
included since they presuppose a different form of language. (p. 126) 
Irzik and Grünberg (1995) contend that this ‘semantic untranslatability’ thesis is essentially the 
same as Kuhn’s local meaning incommensurability thesis and Carnap’s endorsement of this 
thesis follows from his commitment to a semantic holism (i.e., that the theoretical postulates of a 
linguistic framework determine the meaning of theoretical terms in L) similar to Kuhn’s holism 
(pp. 291-293).  
 Other revisionists emphasize that both Carnap and Kuhn maintain that choosing between 
competing scientific theories is a non-epistemic and pragmatic matter (Friedman 2001, pp. 41-
43; 2003, pp. 19-21).2 In Carnap’s philosophy, this stance is explicit in the understanding of 
                                                            
2 Gürol Irzik (2003) has argued—correctly, in my judgment—against this specific claim. In particular, Irzik opposes 
“relativist” interpretations of Carnap and Kuhn (e.g., see Friedman, 1998, 2001), suggesting that both Carnap and 
Kuhn hold nuanced views on scientific rationality that are not accurately described as “relativist” (cf. Axtell 1993; 
Irzik 2003, pp. 331-335). 
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external questions as practical proposals to adopt a particular linguistic framework. Carnap 
([1950] 1956) writes: 
[T]he introduction of [a new linguistic framework] does not need any theoretical 
justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality. . . [W]e have to face at this 
point an important question; but it is a practical, not a theoretical question . . . of whether 
or not to accept the new linguistic forms. The acceptance cannot be judged as true or 
false because it is not an assertion. It can only be judged as being more or less expedient, 
fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is intended. (p. 214) 
For Carnap, choosing a linguistic framework only implies a commitment to a particular way of 
speaking. Since linguistic frameworks can be employed for different purposes, Carnap believes 
that they should be evaluated as instruments for various ends, rather than by their ‘correctness.’ 
In the spirit of the ‘principle of tolerance,’ Carnap recommends a permissive and pluralistic 
attitude towards different linguistic forms (Carnap [1934] 1937, §17; [1950] 1956, p. 221; 
Jeffrey 1994). Kuhn ([1962] 1996, pp. 94-110, pp. 198-207; 1977; 2000, ch. 9) adopts a similar 
stance on the non-epistemic nature of theory-choice insofar as he argues that choosing between 
competing paradigms is a process that cannot be settled in terms of ‘correctness.’ Kuhn (1977) 
emphasizes that in comparing the relative merits of competing paradigms, scientists typically 
appeal to a set of fixed-values (e.g., empirical adequacy, consistency, explanatory scope, 
simplicity); however, when applying these values, proponents of different paradigms will 
interpret and place different weights on these values. Hence, there is no objective (i.e., shared) 
set of values that can be appealed to in theory choice, which necessarily involves appeals to 
subjective factors. Insofar as Kuhn holds that there is no truly objective (or intersubjective) basis 
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for paradigm choice, he endorses the Carnapian view that theory-choice is ultimately non-
epistemic and pragmatic.  
  Revisionists also suggest that Kuhn and Carnap share a similar view of scientific 
revolutions (Reisch 1991; Irzik and Grünberg 1995; Friedman 2001, p. 22, pp. 41-42; Irzik 
2002). Kuhn ([1962] 1996, chs. 9-10) famously rejects the view that scientific change is 
continuous and cumulative. In his model, scientific change proceeds through repeated cycles of 
normal science and revolutionary science. Whereas normal science is a cumulative period of 
puzzle-solving, revolutionary science is characterized by an older paradigm being replaced (in 
whole or in part) by an incommensurable new one. Hence, Kuhnian revolutions are neither rule-
governed nor cumulative, which opposes the putative view that scientific change is progressive 
and cumulative. Revisionists suggest that Carnap endorses a similar view of revolutions. In 
discussing how scientists respond to anomaly (a Quinean ‘recalcitrant experience’), Carnap 
(1963) summarizes his view of revolutions as follows: “[A] change in the language . . .  
constitutes a radical alteration, sometimes a revolution, and it occurs only at certain historically 
decisive points in the development of science. . . . A change of [this] kind constitutes, strictly 
speaking, a transition from a language Ln to a new language Ln+1” (p. 921). Given Carnap’s 
views on semantic untranslatability and the pragmatic nature of theory choice, the transition from 
one linguistic framework to another is a process governed by pragmatic factors, and hence, 






3. A Problem with the Revisionist View 
While the revisionist view reveals some interesting similarities between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s 
philosophical views, when Carnap’s and Kuhn’s views are examined in the context of their 
broader philosophical projects, these similarities turn out to be superficial rather than substantial. 
Revisionist analyses articulate their arguments by framing Carnap’s views in Kuhnian 
terminology, such as ‘paradigms,’ ‘incommensurability,’ and ‘scientific revolutions.’ Moreover, 
they suggest that Carnap’s linguistic frameworks can be understood as an analogue (or formal 
complement) to Kuhn’s paradigms (in the sense of ‘disciplinary matrices’). This exegetical 
perspective, however, obscures the fundamentally disparate nature of the broader philosophical 
projects of Carnap and Kuhn. In particular, it fails to sufficiently acknowledge that Carnap’s 
linguistic frameworks are artificial languages that scientific philosophers construct for purposes 
of logical analysis, while Kuhn’s paradigms are conceived of naturalistically, as a constellation 
of commitments (i.e., symbolic generalizations, metaphysical models, values, exemplars) shared 
by a community of scientists. Framing Carnap’s linguistic frameworks as analogues to Kuhn’s 
paradigms brings Carnap’s philosophical project closer to Kuhn’s agenda of providing an 
accurate historical description actual scientific practices and theories; however, it does so at the 
expense of obscuring the fundamental nature and aims of Carnap’s philosophy. In what follows, 
I explicate the nature of Carnap’s logic of science program to motivate an argument that the 
fundamental differences between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s broader philosophical projects render the 
similarities that revisionists highlight superficial.  
The proper context for understanding Carnap’s philosophy of linguistic frameworks is 
Carnap’s “logic of science” (Wissenschaftslogik), which is Carnap’s proffered replacement for 
‘epistemology’ or ‘philosophy’ more generally (see Richardson 1998, ch. 9). In the forward to 
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Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap ([1934] 1937) presents logic of science as a scientific 
philosophy characterized by logical analysis: 
That part of the work of philosophers which may be held to be scientific . . . consists of 
logical analysis. The aim of logic of science is to provide a system of concepts, a 
language, by the help of which the results of logical analysis will be exactly formulable. 
Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science—that is to say, by the logical analysis 
of the concepts and sentences of the sciences, for the logic of science is nothing other 
than the logical syntax of language. (p. xiii, emphasis in original) 
According to Carnap, the task of scientific philosophers is to logically analyze scientific concepts 
and sentences. This methodological prescription is motivated to ensure meaningful discourse 
about science. Carnap believes that modern logic provides the necessary tools to transform (or 
translate) formerly metaphysical problems into meaningful problems. In “Unity of Science,” 
Carnap ([1931] 1934) rejects the traditional fields of philosophy (i.e., metaphysics, 
epistemology, and ethics), and he describes the problems of scientific philosophy as follows:  
[O]ur own field of investigation is that of Logic. Here are to be found problems of . . . the 
Logic of Science, i.e., the logical analysis of the terms, statements, theories, proper to the 
various department[s] of science. Logical Analysis of Physics, for example, introduces 
the problems of Causality, of Induction, of Probability, the problem of Determinism . . . 
[as] question[s] concerning the logical structure of the systems of physical laws, in 
divorce from all metaphysical questions . . . . Logical Analysis of Biology, again, 
involves the problems of Vitalism, to take one example . . . in a form free from 
Metaphysics, viz. as a question of the logical relations between biological and physical 
terms and laws . . . . In Psychology, Logical Analysis involves, among others the so 
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called problem of the ‘relation between Body and Mind’ . . .  concerned . . . with the 
logical relations between the terms or laws of Psychology and Physics respectively . . . . 
In all empirical sciences, finally, Logical Analysis involves the problem of verification . . 
. as a question concerning the logical inferential relations between statements in general 
and so called protocol or observation statements. (pp. 24-25, emphasis added) 
As indicated in the last sentence of this passage, Carnap maintains that logic of science is 
especially concerned with the problem of “verification” or “confirmation,” which is an aspect of 
Carnap’s philosophy that is consistently neglected by revisionists.3 For the purposes of this 
paper, I want to highlight the deflationary nature of logic of science and indicate how it relates to 
the problem of meaningfulness. By reformulating and reconstructing scientific theories into 
purely logical (i.e., syntactic and semantic) systems or linguistic frameworks, Carnap believes 
that meaningful discourse about science can be ensured by clarifying the empirical basis of 
scientific theories (see Dempoulos 2003, 2007). In the case of sciences such as physics and 
biology, this amounts to translating metaphysical problems into empirically ascertainable ones. 
One of the main tasks of logic of science is to develop an exact and objective method (the 
method of ‘logical syntax’) for discussing scientific propositions. For Carnap ([1934] 1937), the 
“important thing is to develop an exact method for the construction of . . . sentences about 
sentences” (p. xiii, emphasis added). The logical syntax of a language is simply the “formal 
theory of linguistic forms of that language—the systematic statement of formal rules which 
govern it together with the development of the consequences which follow from these rules” 
(ibid, §1). By reconstructing a language into its syntax, Carnap believes that one can specify the 
                                                            
3 Carnap’s preoccupation with these issues is most clearly represented in his various (and increasingly deflationary) 




rules of a language. Carnap proposes to construct sentences about sentences by constructing two 
languages: (1) the object-language, which is the language that is the object of investigation (e.g., 
a scientific theory), and (2) the syntax-language (or meta-language), which is the language used 
to speak about the object-language. Carnap (ibid, §§78-81) believes that confusion occurs when 
philosophers speak within an object-language (the so-called material mode of speech) without 
recognizing that these assertions are made within or relative to an object-language. For Carnap, 
the meta-language (the formal mode of speech)—the perspective that reconstructs sentences and 
concepts of the object language syntactically—is the proper (and metaphysically neutral) 
philosophical perspective for evaluating these sentences, not as assertions, but as proposals to 
use a linguistic framework.  
Given the nature and aims of logic of science, it is important to see that revisionists 
employ a self-serving exegetical strategy when they frame Carnap’s philosophy of linguistic 
frameworks in Kuhnian terms. In particular, it is mistaken to regard Carnapian linguistic 
frameworks as straightforward analogues (or even formal complements) to Kuhnian paradigms. 
This interpretation is suggested by phrases like “every scientific theory is embedded within a 
linguistic framework” (Irzik 2002, p. 607); “a shift from one linguistic framework to another is a 
revolution” (Irzik and Grünberg 1995, p. 295); or “[p]aradigms, like linguistic frameworks, 
constitute the conditions of scientific knowledge – scientific knowledge-making only 
unproblematically occurs when a paradigm is in hand” (Richardson 2007, p. 336). These 
characterizations suggest that Carnapian linguistic frameworks can be understood as akin to 
Kuhnian paradigms, i.e., as a historically-situated set of commitments and assumptions that 
function to bind scientific communities (cf. Irzik and Grünberg 1995, p. 286). This 
understanding, however, inverts Carnap’s philosophy of linguistic frameworks. Carnapian 
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frameworks are not (temporally or logically) prior to scientific theories, but theories are prior to 
linguistic frameworks insofar as the latter are logical reconstructions of scientific theories, which 
are formulated to clarify the meaningful basis of theories. Conversely, from a naturalistic 
perspective, Kuhn ([1962] 1996, ch. 5) regards paradigms as (temporally and logically) prior to 
scientific rules and theories.4 This subtle difference highlights a significant contrast between 
Kuhnian paradigms (i.e., a cluster of shared commitments that are necessary for normal science) 
and Carnapian linguistic frameworks (i.e., formal reconstructions of scientific theories). While 
revisionists are well aware of the artificial nature of linguistic frameworks (Irzik and Grünberg 
1995, p. 288; Friedman 1999, ch. 9; Richardson 1998, ch. 9), when they argue for similarities 
between Carnap and Kuhn, they obscure the nature of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks by 
presenting them in a Kuhnian light.5 
 
 
4. Logical Analysis vs. Historical Analysis 
Differences in Carnap’s and Kuhn’s methodological assumptions reflect two radically 
contrasting styles of doing philosophy of science. In the following section, I dub these two styles 
                                                            
4 In chapter 5 of Structure (“The Priority of Paradigms”), Kuhn argues that it is paradigms (rather than explicit 
rules) that determine the nature of normal science. Kuhn suggests that paradigms are prior to rules in a temporal 
sense (i.e., paradigms will suggest certain rules, but not in a determinate way), but also in terms of importance (i.e., 
paradigms are more important than the rules that are abstracted from the paradigm for binding a community of 
scientists during normal science). On the basis of these considerations, Kuhn suggests that philosophers of science 
ought to focus their attention on paradigms (i.e., exemplars), as a unit of analysis, rather than explicit rules. It is 
important to notice that Kuhn’s methodological prescription is opposed to Carnap’s attempt to reduce scientific 
theories to a set of explicit rules (e.g., syntax). Moreover, the tacit rules discussed by Kuhn are not the same kinds of 
rules at the core of Carnap’s linguistic frameworks (Pincock 2012, pp. 127-128). 
5 From a somewhat different perspective, Peter Galison (1995) suggests that Kuhnian paradigms and Carnapian 
linguistic frameworks are similar insofar as they represent science in terms of “island empires,” i.e., isolated and 
relatively stable assemblages of experimental and theoretical procedures and results. Galison opposes this island 
empire picture of science because it conceals the fragmented and heterogeneous nature of science. 
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logical analysis and historical analysis, and I articulate the assumptions of these fundamentally 
disparate ways of doing philosophy of science. In the context of the revisionist argument, this 
shows that there are good reasons for regarding Carnap’s and Kuhn’s views as standing in an 
antagonistic, rather than complementary, relationship.   
 The most fundamental difference between Carnap’s and Kuhn’s styles of doing 
philosophy of science is their methodological approaches to analyzing scientific theories. For 
Carnap, logical analysis assumes that scientific theories should be analyzed only after they have 
been reconstructed into artificial linguistic frameworks, which scientific philosophers can 
investigate in the formal mode of speech. Kuhn’s approach, by contrast, assumes that theories 
should be analyzed after they have been historically reconstructed as paradigms or lexicons. The 
key difference in Kuhn’s approach is that paradigms are treated and analyzed, not as artificial 
languages, but as naturalistic entities, i.e., as accurate descriptions of scientific theories.6 Hence, 
Kuhnian philosophy of science is concerned with accurately reconstructing scientific theories 
and practices with the aid of a posteriori sciences such as history and psychology (see Giere 
1985; Bird 2002, 2004; Preston 2004). This naturalistic aspect of Kuhn’s approach is entirely 
absent in Carnap’s. Whereas accurate historical reconstruction, for Kuhn, is crucial for proper 
philosophical analysis, Carnap is only concerned with accurate reconstruction to the extent that it 
                                                            
6 As a qualification, Kuhn’s naturalistic approach was most marked in Structure, and in his post-Structure writings, 
Kuhn took a ‘linguistic turn’ wherein his work became more traditionally philosophical and relied less heavily on 
the history of science (see Irzik & Grünberg 1998; Bird 2000, 2002, 2004; Kindi 2005; Mladenović 2007; Gattei 
2008). In offering a qualified defense of the received view on the Carnap-Kuhn relationship, my claim is that 
Kuhn’s early philosophical views—as exemplified in Structure—are significantly different than the style of 
philosophy of science championed by Carnap. While Irzik and Grünberg (1995) focus on Kuhn’s later work in 
advancing their argument that Carnap and Kuhn are ‘close allies,’ I focus on Kuhn’s early views because: (1) 
Kuhn’s Structure was much more influential and widely read by philosophers of science than his later works, and 
(2) Kuhn’s Structure is the most relevant work for the received view on the Carnap-Kuhn relationship that maintains 
that Kuhn contributed to the demise of logical empiricism by offering a revolutionary approach to philosophy of 
science (discussed in §4 of this paper). 
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allows him to distinguish theories into their observational and theoretical parts, which will clarify 
the sense in which theories are cognitively significant.  
 Carnap and Kuhn also adopt contrasting stances on the context of discovery and context 
of justification distinction (Pinto de Oliveira 2007; cf. Uebel 2011). Whereas Carnap assumes a 
sharp distinction (given that logic of science occurs exclusively in the context of justification), 
Kuhn believes that there is no sharp distinction and that issues concerning the justification of 
scientific theories cannot be analyzed in isolation from issues regarding the discovery of those 
theories (Kuhn [1962] 1996, pp. 8-9, pp. 207-208). Carnap’s ideal of rationally reconstructing 
scientific theories into linguistic frameworks assumes that the philosopher can investigate 
questions concerning the justification of scientific theories via logical analysis by clarifying 
which parts of the theories are empirically ascertainable. Issues concerning the justification of 
theories for Kuhn are more complex.7 In response to questions concerning whether his theory is 
descriptive or prescriptive (e.g., see Feyerabend 1970), Kuhn ([1962] 1996, pp. 207-208; 2000, 
p. 130) argued that descriptive generalizations from the history of science can sometimes serve 
as evidence for philosophical prescriptions. This aspect of Kuhn’s philosophy highlights the way 
in which his approach rejects the discovery/ justification distinction and takes actual scientific 
practices seriously. Whereas Carnapian logical analysis takes reconstructed artificial linguistic 
frameworks (removed from the context of discovery) as the proper unit of philosophical analysis, 
Kuhnian historical analysis takes actual scientific theories and practices to be the proper unit of 
analysis (from which prescriptive claims can subsequently be inferred). Whereas Carnap’s 
philosophical system prescribes certain scientific standards a priori (e.g., theories should be non-
metaphysical and empirically meaningful), Kuhn’s philosophy takes a more a posteriori 
                                                            
7 For a more comprehensive discussion of Kuhn’s views on the discovery-justification distinction, see Hoyningen-
Huene (1993, pp. 245-252; 2006). 
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approach insofar as it examines historical cases of science to address questions concerning what 
constitutes good science. 
 These differences in Carnap’s and Kuhn’s approaches demonstrate why it is misleading 
to suggest that their philosophical views are similar on issues of incommensurability. Whereas 
incommensurability, for Carnap, is a trivial fact about certain reconstructed linguistic 
frameworks (e.g., quantum mechanics cannot be fully reconstructed into the terms of classical 
mechanics), for Kuhn, incommensurability is a substantive conclusion that he reaches through 
historical analysis. A central aspect of Kuhn’s thesis is that proponents of competing paradigms 
‘work in different worlds’ and cannot fully communicate with one another. This aspect of 
Kuhnian incommensurability is entirely antithetical to the spirit of Carnap’s logic of science. 
Logic of science is motivated precisely to resolve scientific debates by clarifying which 
disagreements are amenable to meaningful resolution, and which are merely pragmatic. As 
Carnap consistently reported, he was dismayed by fruitless metaphysical debates and logic of 
science is a method for resolving these debates. Hence, incommensurability is a substantive 
conclusion reached by Kuhn (via historical analysis), while it is a starting point for philosophical 
resolution (via logical analysis) for Carnap. 
There are also reasons for resisting the idea that Carnap and Kuhn share a similar view of 
theory-choice. Kuhn’s (1977) suggestion that paradigm choice inevitably involves the 
application of ‘subjective’ (i.e., non-shared) values is a conclusion that he reaches through an 
analysis of the history of science. Against philosophers who believe that theory-choice can be 
‘objective’ by restricting theory-choice to the context of justification, Kuhn suggests that it is 
illegitimate to separate the contexts of discovery and justification. Kuhn (1977, pp. 326-329) 
complains that philosophical analyses that confine theory-choice to the context of justification 
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systematically neglect factors that were historically regarded as relevant evidence and they tend 
to overemphasize arguments that supported the triumphant theory, while neglecting arguments 
that supported the losing theory. Thus, Kuhn’s conclusion that theory-choice inevitable involves 
non-epistemic factors is inferred—in part—on the basis of historical analysis. By contrast, 
Carnap addresses questions regarding theory-choice exclusively in the context of justification. 
Moreover, while both Kuhn and Carnap can be said to share an instrumentalist (or pragmatic) 
stance on theory choice,8 Carnap’s instrumentalism is far more robust. Consider differences 
between their views on the ‘choice’ between classical mechanics and relativistic physics. 
Whereas Kuhn ([1962] 1996, ch. 9) suggests that this was a forced choice between 
incommensurable paradigms that would define the field of physics, Carnap maintains that a 
decision can appeal to different purposes of physicists (Earman 1993, p. 22). On Carnap’s view, 
each theory is useful for different purposes, e.g., classical mechanics is useful for purposes of 
measuring and making predictions about objects moving slower than 3x108 m/s, while 
relativistic mechanics is more useful for objects moving faster than 3x108 m/s. While Kuhn 
insists that this revolution was a case of relativistic physics replacing classical mechanics, 
Carnap adopts the more deflationary conventionalist stance that relativistic physics is an 
instrument that can be freely chosen on pragmatic grounds.  
 The aforementioned differences vitiate the argument that Carnap and Kuhn share a very 
similar view of scientific revolutions. While Carnap describes scientific revolutions in terms of a 
transition from one linguistic framework to another, it is crucial to see that Carnap’s idea that a 
                                                            
8 Kuhn ([1962] 1996, ch. 13, pp. 205-207) adopts an instrumentalist stance on theory-choice insofar as he suggests 
that, historically, paradigms that emerged as victors did so because they had greater puzzle-solving power, i.e., they 
could solve a significant number of puzzles of the previous paradigm and could also solve new puzzles (see Tsou 
2006, pp. 216-217). 
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revolution represents a pragmatic choice to adopt a new language is antithetical to Kuhn’s view. 
Kuhn (2000) writes: 
[T]he cognitive importance of language change was for [Carnap] merely pragmatic. One 
language might permit statements that could not be translated into another, but anything 
properly classified as scientific knowledge could be both stated and scrutinized in either 
language, using the same method and gaining the same result. . . . This aspect of Carnap’s 
position has never been available to me. Concerned . . . with the development of 
knowledge, I have seen each stage in the evolution of a given field as built . . . upon its 
predecessors, the earlier stage providing the problems of the stage that followed. In 
addition, I have insisted that some changes in conceptual vocabulary are required for the 
assimilation and development of the observations, laws, and theories deployed in the 
later stage . . . Given those beliefs, the process of transition from old state to new 
becomes an integral part of science, a process that must be understood . . . to analyze the 
cognitive basis for scientific beliefs. Language change is cognitively significant for me as 
it was not for Carnap. (pp. 227-228, emphasis added) 
This passage indicates why Kuhn believes one cannot reduce a scientific revolution to a change 
in Carnapian linguistic frameworks. For Kuhn, the shift from one paradigm to another is not 
merely a pragmatic choice, but a naturalistic and historical process wherein scientists revise, 
assimilate, and respond to puzzles of the previous paradigm. From Kuhn’s perspective, reducing 
revolutions to a Carnapian external question is to trivialize the problem of scientific change. To 
properly understand scientific development, one must historically analyze how new paradigms 




4. Structure and the demise of logical empricism 
Reflections on Kuhn’s and Carnap’s contrasting approaches to philosophy of science help to 
clarify the historical role played by Kuhn’s Structure in the decline of logical empiricism (cf. 
note 6). According to the analysis of this paper, Structure primarily contributed to the demise of 
logical empiricism by offering a concrete and fruitful example of a historically-oriented, bottom-
up methodology for philosophy of science that opposed to the top-down methodology associated 
with Carnap and the logical empiricists. This understanding provides reasons for rejecting Irzik 
and Grünberg’s (1995, p. 304) contention that post-positivist philosophy of science associated 
with Kuhn does not represent a revolutionary departure from Carnapian philosophy of science.   
The chief role that Structure played in the decline of logical empiricism and emergence 
of post-positivist philosophy of science was methodological. As discussed in section 4 of this 
paper, Carnap’s logic of science adopts a top-down methodology insofar as it begins with certain 
a priori assumptions about what constitutes good science (e.g., science is non-metaphysical and 
empirical) and evaluates particular theories on the basis of these criteria. Kuhn’s approach, by 
contrast, adopts a bottom-up methodology insofar as it begins with a historical examination of 
actual scientific practices and aims to draw philosophical conclusions about what constitutes 
good science via historical analysis.9 In this manner, Structure offered a novel method for 
analyzing science that significantly departed from the logical analyses championed by Carnap. 
By shifting the philosophical unit of analysis away from abstract scientific theories (in the 
                                                            
9 Kuhn’s bottom-up methodology can be understood as a particularist (as opposed to generalist) approach to 
philosophy of science. From this perspective, Structure can be located in a broader tradition of particularist 
approaches in philosophy (e.g., see Kant [1781] 1998; Wittgenstein [1953] 1958; Sellars [1956] 1997; McDowell 
1979; Brandom 1994). For connections between Kuhn’s and Wittgenstein’s views, see Kindi (1995, 2012) and 
Sharrock and Reid (2002). 
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context of justification) and towards historically-situated scientific theories (in the context of 
discovery), historical analysis—as exemplified in Structure—provided an alternative model for 
doing philosophy of science that would strongly influence subsequent generations of 
philosophers of science (and science studies more generally).10 Kuhn’s bottom-up methodology 
opened avenues for more broadly-focused and interdisciplinary philosophical analyses, and 
especially analyses that were closely engaged with the history of science. In contrast to the 
formal analyses of concepts such as ‘confirmation’ and ‘explanation’ offered by logical 
empiricists, philosophical analyses inspired by Structure focused on a broader range of topics, 
such as the role of experiments in science (Hacking, 1983; Franklin 1986; Galison 1987; Chang 
2004), the connections between conceptual development in science and research in cognitive 
science (Giere 1988; Thagard 1988, 1992; Andersen, Barker, & Chen 2006), analogical and 
model-based reasoning in science (Hesse [1963] 1966; Magnani, Nersessian, & Thagard 1999; 
Nersessian 2008), and the social dimensions of science (Hull 1988; Longino 1990, 2002; 
Douglas 2009; Wray 2011). 
In addition to presenting an attractive alternative methodological approach for 
philosophers of science, Structure also contributed to the demise of logical empiricism—on a 
sociological level—by attacking a caricatured ‘everyday image of logical positivism’ and 
illegitimately associating it with the cumulative vision of scientific progress rejected in Structure 
                                                            
10 In the 1960s and 1970s, Kuhn’s Structure emerged as the most iconic and influential example of the new 
historical philosophy of science associated with writers such as Norwood Russell Hanson (1958), Stephen Toulmin 
(1961), Paul Feyerabend (1975), and Larry Laudan (1977). Retrospectively, these works have jointly been 
responsible for the ‘historical turn’ in philosophy of science (Bird 2008). In addition to its influence in philosophy of 
science, Structure had an arguably larger influence in the social sciences, especially among sociologists of science 
(see Bird 2000, ch. 7); Kuhn famously repudiated relativist interpretations of his work by proponents of the ‘strong 
programme’ of the sociology of scientific knowledge (Kuhn 2000, ch. 5).  
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(Richardson 2007; Irzik 2012).11 While the picture of logical empiricism presented by Kuhn in 
Structure was vastly underdeveloped and ultimately misleading, the effect of his work was to 
stabilize and popularize a simplistic view of logical empiricism as a naïve brand of empiricist 
foundationalism (Richardson 2007, pp. 359-369), which Kuhn and subsequent philosophers of 
science could employ as foils for their own arguments.12 Hence, Structure also contributed to the 
demise of logical empiricism—and the rise of post-positivist philosophy of science—by 
promulgating and reifying a false image of logical empiricism.  
At this point, what is correct and incorrect in the revisionist view can be stated with 
clarity. One of the motivations of the revisionist view is to urge that Carnap is a much more 
methodologically sophisticated philosopher of science than is typically thought and that many of 
alleged weaknesses of his view are simply misplaced.13 I am largely sympathetic with this aspect 
of the revisionist argument. A large part of the narrative surrounding the received view on 
Carnap and Kuhn is that one of Kuhn’s chief achievements in Structure was to demonstrate the 
methodological flaws of logical empiricism by highlighting the importance of issues such as the 
theory-ladenness of observation, the underdetermination of theories by evidence, and the non-
epistemic aspects of science. The received view on Carnap and Kuhn is incorrect in assuming 
                                                            
11 With characteristic honesty, Kuhn admitted that he had not read any of the mature works of Carnap when he was 
writing Structure (see Borradori [1991] 1994, p. 153; Kuhn 2000, p. 227, pp. 305-306; Irzik 2012, appendix). Wray 
(2013) points out that Kuhn likely did not feel the need to read later positivist works since he was well-acquainted 
with Quine’s ([1951] 1980) critiques of Carnap, while Kuhn and Quine were colleagues at the Harvard Society of 
Fellows (see Kuhn 2000, p. 279).  
12 Besides Structure, Quine’s influential criticisms of Carnap (Quine [1951] 1980, 1969) undoubtedly served to 
stabilize the image of logical empiricism as an impoverished project in empiricist foundationalism (see Reisch 2005, 
pp. 3-5). For criticisms of Quine’s presentation of Carnap in the context of the Carnap-Quine analyticity debates, see 
Creath (1991), Stein (1992), and Friedman (1999, 2001).   
13 This aspect of the revisionist argument is part of the larger movement of historical scholarship on logical 
empiricism (e.g., see Coffa 1991; Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, & Uebel 1996; Giere & Richardson 1996; Nemeth & 
Stadler 1996; Richardson 1998; Friedman 1999; Hardcastle & Richardson 2003; Stadler 2003; Awodey & Klein 
2004; Okruhlik 2004; Reisch 2005; Carus 2007; Friedman & Creath 2007; Richardson & Uebel 2007; Uebel 2007; 




that Carnap was unaware of or insensitive to these issues; in fact, many of Carnap’s views were 
motivated by precisely these issues. Hence, the revisionist analysis is correct to point out that 
Carnap and Kuhn shared many of the same methodological assumptions and that there are 
similarities in the way that they understood the epistemological structure of scientific theories. 
However, the revisionist view is incorrect in drawing the stronger conclusion that Carnap’s and 
Kuhn’s shared assumptions render their philosophies closely aligned. I have argued that the 
similarities that revisionist analyses highlight are superficial. It is only by ignoring the 
fundamental differences in Carnap’s and Kuhn’s broader philosophical projects that this 
conclusion can be drawn. 
The analysis of this paper also provides a corrective to the received view on the Carnap-
Kuhn relationship. What is correct in the received view is that Kuhn’s Structure ushered in a new 
style of doing philosophy of science, which significantly differed from Carnap’s favored logical 
approach for analyzing science. Compared to Carnap, Kuhn’s approach was characterized by a 
bottom-up approach to analyzing scientific theories and an emphasis on integrating the history of 
science into philosophical analyses. However, the received view is incorrect in maintaining 
Carnap’s and Kuhn’s views are diametrically opposed and that the primary achievement of 
Structure was to demonstrate the false assumptions of positivist philosophy of science. Rather, 
Kuhn’s historical significance in the history of twentieth century philosophy of science was to 
change the focus of philosophy of science (e.g., from formal analyses to confirmation to issues 
concerning the nature of scientific change) and to change the favored methodological tools that 
philosophers of science employed to analyze science (i.e., from formal tools to historical 
resources). As I have argued, Kuhn’s chief methodological achievement was to offer an 
alternative bottom-up and historical approach to analyzing scientific theories, which was 
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opposed to the top-down and logical approach to analyzing theories championed by Carnap. In 
this sense, Structure undoubtedly represents a revolutionary departure from positivist philosophy 
of science, as exemplified in Carnap’s work.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I offered reasons for rejecting the conclusion that Carnap’s and Kuhn’s 
philosophies are closely aligned. In particular, I argued against the revisionist conclusions that 
Carnap and Kuhn share similar views on incommensurability, theory-choice, and scientific 
revolutions. Moreover, I argued that fundamental differences between their styles of philosophy 
of science pertained to their preferred methods of analyzing science (i.e., logical versus historical 
analysis), their stance on the context of discovery/ justification distinction, and the relative 
importance they place on accurately reconstructing science. According to this analysis, the 
primary role that Structure played in the demise of logical empiricism was to offer a novel 
bottom-up methodological approach for analyzing scientific theories that shifted subsequent 
generations of philosophers of science away from the top-down approach espoused by Carnap. 
 In the context of contemporary philosophy of science, Carnap and Kuhn can be regarded 
as model representatives of two distinctive traditions of doing philosophy of science. In the 
Carnapian tradition are philosophers whose analyses investigate science exclusively in the 
context of justification and favor formal methods. In the Kuhnian tradition are philosophers 
whose analyses are closely engaged with the history of science and aim to draw philosophical 
conclusions from historical case studies. While these two styles of philosophy of science need 
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not be regarded as inherently incompatible, it is mistaken to think that these traditions spurned by 
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